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Abstract: With the growing complexity of quantum key distribution (QKD) network structures,
aforehand topology design is of great significance to support a large-number of nodes over a
large-spatial area. However, the exclusivity of quantum channels, the limitation of key generation
capabilities, the variety of QKD protocols and the necessity of untrusted-relay selection, make
the optimal topology design a very complicated task. In this research, a hybrid QKD network
is studied for the first time from the perspective of topology, by analyzing the topological
differences of various QKD protocols. In addition, to make full use of hybrid networking,
an analytical model for optimal topology calculation is proposed, to reach the goal of best
secure communication service by optimizing the deployment of various QKD devices and the
selection of untrusted-relays under a given cost limit. Plentiful simulation results show that
hybrid networking and untrusted-relay selection can bring great performance advantages, and
then the universality and effectiveness of the proposed analytical model are verified.
© 2020 Optical Society of America under the terms of the OSA Open Access Publishing Agreement
1. Introduction
Quantum key distribution (QKD) technology, which generates information-theoretic secure (ITS)
keys between a long distance communication pair based on the laws of quantum mechanics,
has become one of the most promising technologies in quantum communication. However,
it is necessary to establish QKD networks [1–9] based on multiple QKD devices to provide
quantum key service for more users, since a QKD device can only provide quantum keys for a
communication pair. In recent years, the number of nodes in experimental QKD networks has
expanded from 6 [2, 10] to 56 [11], and the transmission distance has extended from 19.6 [12] to
2000 kilometers [11]. With the growing complexity of QKD network structures, the design from
the perspective of topology is of great significance for quality assurance, cost control, and cycle
reduction, etc [13, 14].
With the continuous development of QKD technology, more and more types of QKD protocols
can be used to construct a QKD network. Different protocols vary greatly in terms of key
generation capability, manufacturing cost, fiber dependency and so on. For example, a BB84-QKD
device [15] has a relatively high key generation capability, but the required single-photon detectors
are expensive. By contrast, a GG02-QKD device [16] does not require single photon detector,
which reduces the manufacturing cost, but its key generation capability is lower, especially in the
case of long optical fiber distance. Different from the previous two, a TF-QKD device [17] can
achieve a relatively higher key generation rates in asymmetric fiber distances with a relatively
low manufacturing cost, by overcoming the point-to-point rate-distance limit [18], but it does not
work well in the symmetric case. Therefore, facing the diverse fiber distances in complex network
topology and the limited cost for network construction, it is worth speculating that a hybrid QKD
network composed of multi-type QKD protocols can provide better communication services.
To connect multiple QKD devices, the optical-switch, the quantum-relay, and the trusted-relay
are the three commonly used approaches [19–21]. Due to the scale limitation of optical-
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switches [22] and the technology immaturity of quantum-relays [23, 24], trusted-relay is the
most practical approach at present [11]. This approach carries the risk of information leakage at
trusted-relays. To reduce the risk, several efforts have been made in recent years [25–27], such as
the exclusive-or based key storage [28] and the game-theory based multi-path transmission [29].
However, the premise of the exclusive-or strategy is that the network owner has an efficient node
attack detection capability, while the precondition of the game-theory strategy is that the network
adversary can only attack limited number of nodes. Therefore, the applicability of these strategies
is still limited in the real-life multi-user QKD networks. In order to provide ITS communication
service in a real-life hybrid QKD network, the credibility of each trusted-relay must be controlled,
which leads to the introduction of credibility control cost. It is generally assumed that all
relay nodes are trusted-relays in the previous researches related to trusted-relay based QKD
networks [12,14]. As a result, the total credibility control cost of a whole network is proportional
to the total number of relay nodes. However, for a hybrid QKD network, untrusted-relays,
which do not consume credibility control cost, can also be used to connect some types of QKD
devices [30], such as MDI-QKD and TF-QKD. By selecting some cheap untrusted-relays to
reduce the total number of trusted relays, the total credibility control cost can be effectively saved.
Taking advantage of the saved cost to deploy more QKD devices can certainly generate more
quantum keys. Therefore, in contrast to the traditional default scenario where all relay nodes are
considered to be trusted-relays, it is worth speculating that efficient selection of untrusted-relays
can provide better communication services.
The variety of QKD protocols and the necessity of untrusted-relay selection, coupled with
several intrinsic characteristics of QKD devices, such as the exclusivity of quantum channels and
the limitation of key generation capabilities [18, 31–33], make the optimal design of a hybrid
QKD network a very complicated task [34–38]. In this research, we study the optimal design
of QKD network from the perspective of topology. The main function of topology design is to
provide the best communication service within a given cost limit by carefully deploying QKD
devices and selecting untrusted-relays. In the literature [3] and [39], several cost optimization
models for QKD network construction have been designed through the deployment of QKD
devices and the construction of new relay nodes. However, it is hard to construct a new relay node
according to the optimal working distance calculated by literature [3] in a real network which
is restricted by the physical geography. In addition, MDI-QKD protocol, TF-QKD protocol,
and other QKD protocols that rely on two solid fibers have not been studied in these works.
Furthermore, all nodes in their QKD networks are considered to be trusted-relays, i.e., the
selection of untrusted-relays has not been considered.
• In this research, to study the hybrid QKD network, the topological differences between the
client-to-client (C2C-QKD) protocol and the client-server-client (CSC-QKD) protocol were
analyzed.
• To make full use of hybrid networking, an analytical model for optimal topology calculation
was proposed to calculate the optimal network performance under a given cost limit, and then
obtain the optimal deployment of various QKD devices and the selection of untrusted-relays.
• To verify the universality and effectiveness of this work, a comprehensive simulation based
on random topology and real topology was designed. Simulation results demonstrated the
advantages of hybrid networking and untrusted-relay selection.
The paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, the topological differences are presented in
detail. Based on the method, an analytical model for optimal topology calculation are proposed in
Section 3. In Section 4, the simulations of topology calculation, based on the proposed analytical
model, are presented and the results are analyzed. Section 5 presents the concluding remarks.
2. Topological differences of various QKD protocols
For all types of QKD protocols, quantum state transmission is an important step. Its dependence
on quantum channels leads to a typical problem of quantum channel exclusiveness for QKD
devices. To solve this problem, researchers have put forward many approaches, such as
wavelength-division-multiplexing and orthogonal-frequency-division-multiplexing, to realize
the multiplexing of quantum channels on existing optical fibers, so as to provide quantum keys
without changing existing communication facilities. As a result, the dependence problem on
the existing optical fibers, i.e. fiber dependency, emerges. According to the distinction on
fiber dependency, existing various QKD protocols can be divided into C2C-QKD protocol and
CSC-QKD protocol, as shown in Fig. 1.
Fig. 1. The topological differences of various QKD protocols
The C2C-QKD protocol refers to the protocol that only one optical fiber is needed to connect
a communication pair, such as BB84-QKD or E91-QKD. In contrast, the CSC-QKD protocol
requires the participation of an untrusted third party (UTP), which is actually an untrusted-relay.
Meanwhile, both of the two communication parties should connect to the UTP through one
optical fiber. MDI-QKD and TF-QKD are the representatives of this kind. For demonstration
purposes, we define the two communication parties of a C2C-QKD device as two C2C-clients
and label the quantum channel connecting two C2C-clients as a C2C-edge. Similarly, the two
communication parties of a CSC-QKD device are defined as two CSC-clients, the UTP is called
a CSC-server, and the two quantum channels connecting CSC-clients and CSC-server are labeled
as two CSC-edges. In a hybrid QKD network, each node may plays one or more roles as a
C2C-client, a CSC-client or a CSC-server, and each edge may contain one or more C2C-edges or
CSC-edges.
3. An analytical model for optimal topology calculation
3.1. Notations and definitions
We summarize the notations used throughout the rest of this paper in Table 1 and make the
following explanations.
Table 1. Main notations used in the research
Notation Explanation Value
Ds,t Average communication demand of a communication pair(s, t) R
+
0
βs,t
Ratio of key length to plaintext length in the adopted
encryption algorithm
R+0
R(u,v)
Key generation capability of a C2C-QKD device arranged
on the C2C-edge (u, v) R
+
0
Rˆ(u,p,v)
Key generation capability of a CSC-QKD device arranged
on the CSC-edge (u, p, v) R
+
0
C Available network construction cost R+0
S(u,v)
Number of C2C-QKD devices arranged on the C2C-edge
(u, v) N
Sˆ(u,p,v)
Number of CSC-QKD devices arranged on the CSC-edge
(u, p, v) N
T (v) Credibility of node v ∈ V {0, 1}
Fs,t(u,v)
Flow amount of a communication pair (s, t) passing
through the C2C-edge (u, v) R
+
0
Fˆs,t(u,p,v)
Flow amount of a communication pair (s, t) passing
through the CSC-edge (u, p, v) R
+
0
B Global satisfaction degree of all communication demands R+0
To expand the discussion more smoothly, it is necessary to explain in detail the definition and
meaning of SoD, G-SoD and MG-SoD, the three main concepts used for topology evaluation, as
shown below.
Definition 3.1.1 (SoD) For a communication pair (s, t), its satisfaction degree of communication
demand (SoD), Bs,t , is the ratio of its total key consumption, As,t , to its total key demand [11],
i.e.,
Bs,t =
As,t
Ds,t · βs,t , (1)
where As,t can be calculated by the total difference between the flows into and out of the source
node s, i.e.,
As,t =
∑
v∈V
[
Fs,t(s,v) − Fs,t(v,s)
]
+
∑
p∈V,v∈V
[
Fˆs,t(s,p,v) − Fˆs,t(v,p,s)
]
. (2)
Definition 3.1.2 (G-SoD) For a QKD network with a given topology G = (V, E), its global
satisfaction degree of all communication demands (G-SoD), B, is defined as the worst performance
of all communication pairs [11]. Thus, B can be calculated by the minimum value of all SoDs,
i.e.,
B = min
s∈V,t∈V B
s,t = min
s∈V,t∈V
As,t
Ds,t · βs,t . (3)
Definition 3.1.3 (MG-SoD) For a QKD network topology G = (V, E), its optimal performance
is defined as the maximum of all possible G-SoDs (MG-SoD), each of which is defined as the
worst performance of all communication pairs over a possible flow assignment [11].
3.2. The proposed analytical model
To make full use of hybrid networking, an analytical model, which is essentially an optimization
formulation, is designed to solve the problem of the optimal deployment of various QKD devices
and the selection of untrusted-relays for a hybrid QKD network.
The input items of this formulation mainly include the existing classical network, the commu-
nication demand, the key generation capability and the limited construction cost. (i) The existing
classical network is represented as a directed graph G = (V, E). Then, the set of all optional C2C-
edges is E and the set of all optional CSC-edges is Eˆ = {(u, p, v) | (u, p) ∈ E, (p, v) ∈ E}. (ii) The
communication demand is defined as Ds,t and the key consumption ratio as βs,t . Therefore, the
requested key demand is Ds,t · βs,t for each communication pair (s, t) (s ∈ V, t ∈ V). In particular,
βs,t = 1 indicates that the one-time-pad algorithm is adopted to achieve ITS communication and
βs,t = 0 indicates that the adopted encryption algorithm does not require quantum keys. (iii)
The key generation capability for each C2C-QKD device arranged on the C2C-edge (u, v) ∈ E is
denoted as R(u,v), and the key generation capability for each CSC-QKD device arranged on the
CSC-edge (u, p, v) ∈ Eˆ is denoted as Rˆ(u,p,v). (iv) The total cost for QKD network construction
is limited to C, which mainly includes the manufacturing cost of QKD devices and the credibility
control cost of trusted-relays.
The decision variables of this formulation mainly contain three types: integer variable, boolean
variable and continuous variable. (i) The integer variable S(u,v) represents the number of C2C-
QKD devices arranged on the C2C-edge (u, v), and Sˆ(u,p,v) represents the number of CSC-QKD
devices arranged on the CSC-edge (u, p, v). (ii) The boolean variable T (v) indicates whether
node v is a trusted-relay and whether credibility control is required for this node. (iii) The
continuous variable Fs,t(u,v) represents the flow amount of the communication pair (s, t) [11,40,41]
passing through the C2C-edge (u, v), Fˆs,t(u,p,v) represents the flow amount of the communication
pair (s, t) passing through the CSC-edge (u, p, v), and B represents the quality of a QKD network
topology, which can be measured by the G-SoD [11].
The complete formulation is then given by,
Maximize:
B. (4)
Subject to:
∀ (u, v) ∈ E, 0 ≤
∑
s∈V,t∈V
[
Fs,t(u,v) + F
s,t
(v,u)
]
≤ S(u,v)R(u,v) + S(v,u)R(v,u), (5)
∀ (u, p, v) ∈ Eˆ, 0 ≤
∑
s∈V,t∈V
[
Fˆs,t(u,p,v) + Fˆ
s,t
(v,p,u)
]
≤ Sˆ(u,p,v) Rˆ(u,p,v) + Sˆ(v,p,u) Rˆ(v,p,u), (6)
∀s ∈ V, ∀t ∈ V, ∀u ∈ (V − {s, t}) ,
∑
v∈V
[
Fs,t(u,v) − Fs,t(v,u)
]
+
∑
p∈V,v∈V
[
F
s,t
(u,p,v) − F
s,t
(v,p,u)
]
= 0,
(7)
∀s ∈ V, ∀t ∈ V,
∑
v∈V
[
Fs,t(s,v) − Fs,t(v,s)
]
+
∑
p∈V,v∈V
[
Fˆs,t(s,p,v) − Fˆs,t(v,p,s)
]
= As,t, (8)
∀s ∈ V, ∀t ∈ V,
∑
v∈V
[
Fs,t(t,v) − Fs,t(v,t)
]
+
∑
p∈V,v∈V
[
Fˆs,t(t,p,v) − Fˆs,t(v,p,t)
]
= −As,t, (9)
∀s ∈ V, ∀t ∈ V, As,t − B · Ds,t · βs,t ≥ 0, (10)∑
(u,v)∈E
S(u,v) + q1
∑
(u,p,v)∈Eˆ
Sˆ(u,p,v) + q2
∑
v∈V
T (v) − C ≤ 0, (11)
∀v ∈ V,T (v) =
{
0 if I (v) = 0,
1 if I (v) , 0, (12)
where
I (v) =
∑
(u,v)∈E
S(u,v) +
∑
(v,u)∈E
S(v,u) +
∑
(u,p,v)∈Eˆ
Sˆ(u,p,v) +
∑
(v,p,u)∈Eˆ
Sˆ(v,p,u). (13)
The objective function is expressed in Eq. (4), which maximizes the G-SoD. Constraints Eqs.
(5, 6) state the capacity constraint condition, i.e., the total flow amount through an edge must be
lower than the total key generation capability on this edge. Constraint Eq. (7) expresses the flow
conservation condition, i.e., the total flow amount that enters a non-source-sink node must be
equal to the total flow amount that exits this node. Constraints Eqs. (8-10) prove that sufficient
key materials from the source node to the sink one is available to satisfy the key demand between
the two nodes. Constraint Eq. (11) requires the actual cost must be no higher than the limited
cost. Here, we use the price of a C2C-QKD device as the basis of cost calculation. Besides, the
price of a CSC-QKD device is assumed to be q1 times the base value, and the credibility control
cost of a trusted-relay be q2 times the base value. Constraint Eq. (12) carries out the selection of
untrusted-relays, which have neither been C2C-client nor CSC-Client.
In this formulation, all other constraints are linear functions, except the Eq. (12) which is a
piecewise function. To facilitate the solution, we transform the Eq. (12) into a linear expression by
means of approximation, making this formulation a standard mixed-integer linear programming
(MILP) model. More specifically, the Eq. (12) is rewritten as Eq. (14) by introducing additional
boolean decision variableT ′ (v) and continuous decision variableT ′′ (v), whereM is an arbitrarily
large real number. 
∀v ∈ V,T ′ (v) + T ′′ (v) = 1,
∀v ∈ V, I (v) − M · T (v) ≤ 0,
∀v ∈ V, I (v) + T ′ (v) − T ′′ (v) ≥ 0.
(14)
The decision variables of this standard MILP formulation are listed below:
B ∈ R+0 ,
∀ (u, v) ∈ E, ∀s ∈ V, ∀t ∈ V, Fs,t(u,v) ∈ R+0 ,
∀ (u, p, v) ∈ Eˆ, ∀s ∈ V, ∀t ∈ V, Fˆs,t(u,p,v) ∈ R+0 ,
∀ (u, v) ∈ E, S (u, v) ∈ N,
∀ (u, p, v) ∈ Eˆ, Sˆ (u, p, v) ∈ N,
∀v ∈ V,T (v) ∈ {0, 1} ,
∀v ∈ V,T ′ (v) ∈ {0, 1} ,
∀v ∈ V,T ′′ (v) ∈ R+0 .
(15)
As a typical MILP model, this formulation can be solved by a mature linear programming
solver, Gurobi [42, 43]. After optimization, the proposed model is convenient to retrieve the
MG-SoD (i.e., the objective function value), the number of QKD devices to be installed on each
edge (i.e., S(u,v) and Sˆ(u,p,v)), the nodes to be selected as untrusted-relays (i.e., T (v)), and the
paths to be selected for each communication pair to route the encrypted messages (i.e., Fs,t(u,v) and
Fˆs,t(u,p,v)).
4. Simulation results and analysis
4.1. Optimal topology calculation of several random graphs
We evaluate the calculation results of our proposed analytical model on 13 random graphs, which
are generated based on the ER model [44, 45]. These random graphs are set as follows: each
family consists of 10 instances with a fixed number of nodes, an average nodal degree of 3, a
set of edge lengths uniformly distributed at [10, 500] kilometers, and a uniform traffic matrix
established at [100, 500] kbps between one fifth of nodes allowing the remaining four-fifths
the opportunity to act as untrusted-relays. The simulation platform adopted in this research is
detailed in Table 2.
Table 2. The simulation platform
Parameter Value
CPU
Version Intel(R) Core(TM) i9-9820X
Performance 10-Cores@3.3GHz
Gurobi
TimeLimit 7200s
SolutionLimit 200
MIPGap 0.01
In addition, we adopt the decoy-QKD protocol [38] to prepare C2C-QKD devices, and the
SNS-TF-QKD [17] protocol to prepare CSC-QKD devices. To simplify the analysis, we assume
that the parameters of all C2C-QKD devices are the same, and the parameters of all CSC-QKD
devices are also the same. It should be noted that the proposed analytical model supports the
configuration of different parameter setting for each QKD device. The main cost of a decoy-QKD
device mainly comes from two single-photon detectors, similarly, the main cost of a SNS-TF-QKD
device also mainly comes from the same detectors. Therefore, q1 is assumed to be 1, by taking
the price of a decoy-QKD device as the basis of cost calculation. Considering the complexity of
credibility control, which is usually realized by physical protection [46–50], q2 is assumed to be
100. In addition, the overall cost for network construction is limited to 10000.
To demonstrate the advantages of hybrid networking and untrusted-relay selection clearly, the
average values of all MG-SoDs obtained from 13 families of random graphs are standardized.
Specifically, the simulation result in the case of hybrid networking and untrusted-relay selection
is normalized as 100%, and the remaining results are normalized as the ratio to the above values,
for each graph size.
Fig. 2. Standardized MG-SoDs. The orange curves show the values for hybrid networks which
contains both CSC-QKD and C2C-QKD devices; the blue curves denote the values for pure-CSC
networks consisting of CSC-QKD devices only; the green curves denote the values for pure-C2C
networks consisting of C2C-QKD devices only. The solid lines and dotted lines represent the
cases with or without untrusted-relay selection respectively.
In Fig. 2, we report the standardized MG-SoDs of hybrid networks, pure-C2C networks and
pure-CSC networks versus the graph size with or without untrusted-relay selection, respectively.
As can be seen from the figure, higher MG-SoDs can be achieved when using multi-type QKD
protocols: the value of hybrid network curves, which are orange, is always higher than that of
green and blue curves. Higher MG-SoDs can be achieved by carefully selecting untrusted-relays:
the value of the solid lines is always higher than the dotted lines. In addition, as the number of
nodes increases, the performance of pure-C2C networks drops sharply, while such performance
drop of pure-CSC networks is not always obvious. Furthermore, without untrusted-relay selection,
the performances of all three types of QKD networks decrease monotonically with the increase
of graph size.
To show the solving difficulty of our proposed analytical model more intuitively, we report the
runtime results of different networking schemes in Fig. 3. As can be seen from the figure, the
addition of hybrid networking and untrusted-relay selection makes the solving more difficult: the
value of hybrid network curves, which are orange, is always higher than that of green and blue
curves, and the value of the solid lines is always higher than the dotted lines. More obviously, as
the number of nodes increases, the runtime of hybrid networks with untrusted-relay selection
is always the longest, followed by the pure-CSC networks with untrusted-relay selection. By
contrast, the runtimes of the remaining four schemes are much shorter, because they have fewer
decision variables and fewer constraints. In addition, the optimal solution cannot be obtained
Fig. 3. Runtimes of different networking schemes. The orange curves show the values for hybrid
networks; the blue curves denote the values for pure-CSC networks; the green curves denote
the values for pure-C2C networks. The solid lines and dotted lines represent the cases with or
without untrusted-relay selection respectively.
within 7200 seconds, when the number of nodes reaches 55. It is worth to mention that, it is
essential to design corresponding heuristic algorithm [51, 52] to accelerate the calculation of
optimal solution for large-scale network construction, which is also the research focus of our
future work.
4.2. Optimal topology calculation of a real NSFNET topology
Although the above results are sufficient to prove the universality of this study, another simulation
based on a real NSFNET topology (14 nodes and 21 edges) [11], as shown in Fig. 4, is conducted
to further verify the effectiveness of the proposed analytical model.
Fig. 4. Topology of NSFNET network.
Under the same assumptions, the corresponding optimal design is shown in Table 3, where
Hyd. SoD, C2C. SoD, and CSC. SoD are used to indicate the MG-SoDs of hybrid network,
pure-C2C network and pure-CSC network, respectively. From the data in the table, it can be
concluded that both the hybrid networking and the untrusted-relay selection play a critical role in
optimal topology design; therefore, the effectiveness of this study is verified.
Furthermore, it should be pointed out that, although the above simulation only gives the results
of a set of specific input parameters due to the length limit, the conclusions are also established
Table 3. Optimal design under NSFNET topology
Selection Hyd. SoD C2C. SoD CSC. SoD
No 828.12 740.95 335.93
Yes 915.65 785.09 383.37
for various input parameters.
5. Conclusion
In conclusion, we have proposed an analytical model to find the optimal deployment of various
QKD devices and the selection of untrusted-relays under a given cost limit, and then to create
a high-quality hybrid QKD network with the existing classical network. Through simulation,
the universality and effectiveness of this study have been verified. In the process of research,
the proposed model is calculated by using existing computing tools, Gurobi. However, in the
face of large-scale QKD networks, specific heuristic algorithms should be designed to accelerate
the calculation of the proposed model, which is also the research focus of our future work. In
addition, to further improve the topology performance, we will study the physical protection of
trusted-relays thoroughly based on existing works, to quantify and reduce the physical protection
cost in our future work. We anticipate that the proposed model could contribute a significance
for researchers to accelerate the construction process of QKD networks.
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